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The 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture 
Protecting Investors in Securitization Transactions: 
Does Dodd–Frank Help, or Hurt? 
Steven L. Schwarcz

 
Securitization has been called into question because of its role in 
the recent financial crisis. I examine the potential flaws in the 
securitization process and compare how the Dodd–Frank Act treats 
them. Although Dodd–Frank addresses one of the flaws, it 
underregulates or fails to regulate other flaws. It also overregulates 
by addressing aspects of securitization that are not flawed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Securitization has been criticized because of its role in the 
recent financial crisis. Securitization refers to a category of 
financing transactions in which companies sell rights to payment 
under mortgage loans, accounts receivable, lease rentals, and other 
types of income-producing financial assets to a trust or other 
special-purpose vehicle (an “SPV,” sometimes interchangeably 
called a special-purpose entity or SPE). The goal is to separate 
these assets from the risks generally associated with the 
company—usually called the “originator” to distinguish it from the 
SPV. The originator then can use these assets, held by the SPV, to 
raise funds in the capital markets at a lower cost than if it had 
borrowed the funds.  
Securitization accomplishes this cost saving for two reasons. 
First, by raising funds without having to borrow from a bank or 
other financial intermediary, the originator avoids the intermediary’s 
profit mark-up. This approach, called “disintermediation,” is similar 
to buying wholesale (rather than retail). 
Second, the interest rate payable on the securities issued by an 
SPV is ordinarily lower than the interest rate payable on corporate 
securities issued directly by the originator. This interest-rate 
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savings reflects that financial assets are usually more 
creditworthy—and almost always easier to understand and value—
than an originator itself, which has all of the business and other 
risks associated with an operating company.
1
 
Most securitization transactions follow a typical sequence of 
steps. When an originator sells financial assets to an SPV, the SPV 
issues securities to capital market investors. The SPV uses the cash 
proceeds of the securities issuance to pay the originator the 
purchase price of the financial assets. These steps are usually 
deemed to occur simultaneously.  
Investors in the SPV’s securities expect to ultimately be paid 
from collections on the financial assets purchased by the SPV. If, 
for example, those assets are residential mortgage loans, investors 
will be paid from mortgage payments made by the homeowners on 
those loans. Securities of an SPV that are payable from (i.e., 
backed by) collections on mortgage loans are often called 
mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”). Securities of an SPV that are 
payable from collections on other types of financial assets are often 
called asset-backed securities (“ABS”). References to ABS and 
asset-backed securities can also more broadly—and in my lecture, 
will—include MBS and mortgage-backed securities. 
The first recognized securitization transactions took place in 
the United States in the early 1970s and involved pools of 
mortgage loans originated by savings and loan associations. These 
companies needed to turn their mortgage loans into cash to 
continue financing local housing demands. To achieve this, the 
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) 
facilitated securitizations through SPVs in the form of trusts 
holding mortgage loans and issuing securities in the form of trust 
certificates to investors.  
Since then, securitization has become the principal means by 
which banks and other mortgage lenders turn residential home 
mortgage loans into cash in order to make new residential home 
mortgage loans and expand home ownership in the United States.
2
 
                                                                                                             
 1. Thus, securities backed by financial assets are usually more 
creditworthy than securities issued directly by the originators. STEVEN L. 
SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET 
SECURITIZATION § 1:3 (3d ed. & Supp. 2010) (explaining that except for the 
most highly rated issuers, securities issued in securitization transactions 
typically are more highly rated than the issuer’s own debt securities—and that, 
even where the latter are more highly rated, securitization provides additional 
market flexibility to obtain financing). 
 2. Indeed, securitization more generally had become so important to the 
American economy that the Securities and Exchange Commission observed in 
1992 that it was “becoming one of the dominant means of capital formation in 
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Securitization has also become an important way for companies of 
all types to raise low-cost financing.  
This lecture focuses on the Dodd–Frank Act’s impact on 
investor protection in securitization transactions. the analysis 
begins by examining securitization’s role in the recent financial 
crisis. There is, however, an important perspective to keep in mind 
throughout the lecture. Investors in securitization transactions are 
generally large financial institutions such as banks, insurance 
companies, pension funds, and hedge funds. Many of these 
institutions are so large and sophisticated that they constitute 
qualified institutional buyers (“QIBs”) under SEC Rule 144A,3 
enabling them to freely buy securities from and sell securities to 
other QIBs as if the securities were issued in a registered public 
offering.
4
 One might question whether Dodd–Frank, or any other 
legislation, should have the goal of protecting these types of 
investors.
5
  
I. SECURITIZATION’S ROLE IN THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The securitization of subprime mortgage loans—essentially 
mortgage loans made to risky borrowers—is widely viewed as a 
root cause of the financial crisis. Securitization transactions were 
sometimes backed, at least in part, by these types of loans. Because 
home prices had generally been increasing in the United States 
since the Great Depression, the expectation was that continuing 
home-price appreciation would enable even risky borrowers to 
repay their loans by refinancing their houses. But this model failed 
when, in 2007 and 2008, home prices fell significantly.  
Many argue that the “originate-to-distribute” model of 
securitization, enabling mortgage lenders to sell off loans as they 
are made, led to overreliance on the expectation of repayment 
through home-price appreciation. According to this argument, the 
                                                                                                             
 
the United States.” Investment Company Act Release No. 19105, [1992 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,062, at 83,500 (Nov. 19, 1992) (provided 
in connection with the issuance of Rule 3a-7 under the Investment Company Act 
of 1940).  
 3. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the 
Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 385 (2008) (defining 
QIBs and noting they were the group that lost the most money during the recent 
financial crisis). 
 4. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1995). 
 5. My lecture does not purport to address the narrow issue of mortgagor 
protection. Much has already been written on that topic, and mortgage loans are 
only a subset of the financial assets involved in securitization transactions. 
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originate-to-distribute model created moral hazard because lenders 
did not have to live with the credit consequences of their loans. 
Loan origination standards therefore fell.
6
  
I will later discuss other possible explanations of why subprime 
loans were made and securitized. Whatever the explanation, the 
fall in home prices meant that subprime borrowers who were 
relying on refinancing for loan repayment could not refinance. 
Furthermore, many subprime mortgage loans had adjustable rates 
which increased after an initial “teaser” period. Borrowers who 
could not afford the rate increases had expected to refinance at 
lower interest rates. That likewise was stymied by collapsing home 
prices. For these reasons, risky borrowers began defaulting. 
The defaults had mostly localized consequences in ordinary 
securitization transactions. But, they had larger, systemic 
consequences in transactions that involved complex and highly 
leveraged securitizations of ABS already issued in prior 
securitizations—effectively “securitizations of securitizations.”7 I 
refer to these collectively as “ABS CDO” transactions.8  
The distinction can be explained in a simplified manner as 
follows. In ordinary securitization transactions, payment on the 
ABS is derived directly from collections on the underlying 
financial assets owned by the SPV. When the underlying pool of 
financial assets includes mixed types of assets, such as mortgage 
loans and non-mortgage loans, the securitization is sometimes 
referred to as a collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) transaction. 
Yet, it is still an ordinary transaction, and payment is still derived 
directly from the underlying financial assets.   
Problems began to arise, however, when ABS issued in 
ordinary securitization transactions were themselves securitized in 
the ABS CDO transactions, under which numerous classes, or 
“tranches,” of securities of descending priority were sold to 
investors. The resulting leverage caused relatively small errors in 
cash flow projections—due to unexpectedly high default rates on 
underlying subprime loans—to create defaults on substantial 
amounts of low-investment-grade-rated subordinated tranches of 
these securities, and to cause even AAA-rated senior tranches of 
these securities to be downgraded. 
Why did these transactions degenerate to the point that even 
relatively small errors in cash flow projections caused defaults and 
                                                                                                             
 6. Arguably, the fall was exacerbated by the fact that mortgage lenders 
could make money on the volume of loans originated. 
 7. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 220 (2009). 
 8. These are CDOs of ABS. 
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downgradings? One explanation is that securitization’s focus on 
mathematical modeling to statistically predict the payments on 
financial assets underlying ABS CDO securities fostered an 
overreliance on modeling and an abandonment of common sense.
9
 
Another explanation is that investors, who seemed as anxious to 
buy these securities as underwriters were to sell them, were overly 
complacent.   
Whatever the reasons, these defaults and downgradings 
spooked investors, who believed “AAA” meant iron-clad safety 
and “investment grade” meant relative freedom from default. 
Investors started losing confidence in ratings and avoiding the debt 
markets. Fewer investors meant that the price of debt securities 
began falling. Falling prices meant that firms using debt securities 
as collateral had to mark them to market and put up cash. But that 
required the sale of more securities, causing market prices to 
plummet further downward in a death spiral. 
The U.S. Government’s refusal in mid-September 2008 to save 
Lehman Brothers, and Lehman’s resulting bankruptcy, added to 
this collapse. Investors lost all confidence in debt markets, and 
even the short-term commercial paper market virtually shut down. 
The lack of debt financing meant companies could no longer grow 
and, in some cases, even survive. That affected the real economy 
and, at least in part, contributed to the financial crisis.  
The crisis was also arguably exacerbated by the fact that 
securitization made it difficult to work out problems with the 
underlying mortgage loans. The beneficial owners of the loans 
were no longer the mortgage lenders, but a broad universe of 
investors in the ABS. Servicers theoretically bridged the gap, 
tasked with the responsibility to restructure the underlying loans 
“in the best interests” of those investors. The reality, however, was 
more problematic.  
Servicers were reluctant to engage in restructurings when there 
was uncertainty that their costs would be reimbursed. Foreclosure 
costs, in contrast, were relatively minimal. Servicers also preferred 
foreclosure over restructuring because foreclosure was more 
ministerial and thus had lower litigation risk.
10
 As a result, 
                                                                                                             
 9. See Steve Lohr, In Modeling Risk, the Human Factor Was Left Out, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at B1 (describing how the models failed to keep pace 
with the complex securities); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 
41 CONN. L. REV. 1313, 1323–24 (2009). 
 10. Restructuring can involve difficult decisions. For example, in a 
mortgage securitization transaction in which cash flows deriving from principal 
and interest are separately allocated to different investor classes, or tranches, a 
restructuring that reduces the interest rate would adversely affect investors in the 
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foreclosure was artificially favored, forcing many homeowners 
from their homes and further driving down property values.  
II. DODD–FRANK’S RESPONSE 
The Dodd–Frank Act11 addresses securitization, by focusing, 
essentially, on three issues: (i) adequacy of disclosure, (ii) conflicts 
between securitizers and investors, and (iii) rating agency 
information. In discussing Dodd–Frank, I will occasionally use the 
Act’s term, “securitizer.” The term is somewhat imprecise, 
meaning either the issuer of ABS or a person who organizes and 
initiates an ABS transaction by selling or otherwise transferring 
financial assets, directly or indirectly, to the issuer.
12
 Because 
issuers of ABS are virtually always SPVs, the real securitizer 
impacted by the Act would usually be either the originator itself or 
an investment bank that pools financial assets into an SPV for 
eventual issuance of CDO or ABS CDO securities. 
(i) Adequacy of Disclosure: The Act directs the SEC to 
require more standardized disclosure of information regarding the 
underlying financial assets, including information on the assets 
underlying each class of ABS.
13
 This disclosure requirement is 
intended to facilitate an easier comparison of classes.
14
 The Act 
also directs the SEC to require securitizers to engage in a due-
diligence review of the underlying financial assets and to disclose 
to investors the nature of the review.
15
  
(ii) Conflicts between Securitizers and Investors: The Act 
attempts to limit conflicts of interest between securitizers and 
investors by requiring securitizers, in transactions that are not 
backed entirely by qualified residential mortgage loans,
16
 to retain 
an unhedged economic interest in the credit risk of each class of 
ABS.
17
 This is colloquially known as keeping “skin in the game.” 
                                                                                                             
 
interest-only tranche (and likewise, a restructuring that reduces principal would 
adversely affect investors in the principal-only tranche). 
 11. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, §§ 941–946, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank Act]. 
 12. Id. § 941(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (2010)). 
 13. Id. § 942(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §77g(c) (2010)). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. § 945 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77g(d) (2010)). 
 16. The SEC and other governmental agencies are directed to collectively 
define what constitutes qualified residential mortgage loans, taking into account 
mortgage risk factors. Id. § 941(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 
(2010)).  
 17. Id. § 941 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (2010)). 
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The minimum retained interest is generally five percent,
18
 although 
it may be less if the financial assets meet quality standards to be 
announced by government agencies.
19
 
(iii) Rating Agency Information: Dodd–Frank also requires the 
SEC to adopt regulations requiring rating agencies to explain, in 
any report accompanying an ABS credit rating, the representations, 
warranties, and other enforcement rights available to investors, 
including a comparison of how these rights differ from rights in 
similar transactions.
20
 
In addition to these securitization-targeted provisions, Dodd–
Frank attempts to generally increase investor protection. For 
example, it enables the SEC to impose a fiduciary standard on 
broker–dealers providing personalized investment services.21 It 
also provides special protections for investors who are older 
individuals.
22
 These more general protections, however, would not 
appear to be significant to investors in securitization transactions, 
who are usually financial institutions that choose their investments 
through internal financial analysts rather than acting through 
broker–dealers or other fiduciaries.   
Much of the substance of the Dodd–Frank Act will be realized 
through administrative rulemaking by the SEC and other federal 
government agencies.
23
 The Act also creates a Financial Stability 
Oversight Council to examine and monitor possible sources of 
systemic risk
24
 and to identify any regulatory gaps.
25
  
                                                                                                             
 18. When an originator retains some risk, that risk subtracts from the 5% 
risk that the securitizer would otherwise have to hold. 
 19. These agencies are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
Federal Reserve Board, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
 20. Dodd–Frank Act § 943 (2010). Dodd–Frank also has provisions, 
indirectly affecting securitization, aimed at increasing the reliability of credit 
ratings issued by rating agencies. See, e.g., id. §§ 931–939H. Dodd–Frank also 
includes provisions regulating credit rating agencies. 
 21. Id. § 913 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2010)). 
 22. Id. § 989A (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5537 (2010)). 
 23. Cf. Lois L. Weinroth & Richard L. Fried, Securitization Provisions of 
the Dodd–Frank Act, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Fall 2010, at 38, 43 (observing that 
“it is impossible to predict at this time the full range of regulations that will be 
applicable to the asset-backed securitization industry”). 
 24. Dodd–Frank Act § 111 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2010)). 
The Secretary of the Treasury chairs the Council, which has nine additional 
voting members (all but one of whom is a federal agency head, including the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board). Because the Council meets only 
periodically, its day-to-day operations are run through a new Office of Financial 
Research within the Department of the Treasury. This office is responsible for 
collecting data from regulators and market participants, issuing reports on 
potential regulatory gaps, and making supervisory recommendations. Id. §§ 116, 
152–154. 
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III. DOES DODD–FRANK ADDRESS SECURITIZATION’S FLAWS? 
I believe that Dodd–Frank inadequately addresses 
securitization’s flaws. Although it addresses one of the flaws (or, at 
least, alleged flaws), it underregulates or fails to regulate other 
flaws. It also overregulates by addressing aspects of securitization 
that are not flawed.  
A. Dodd–Frank Addresses One of Securitization’s Flaws 
Dodd–Frank addresses one of securitization’s flaws—or at 
least one of its alleged flaws. I mentioned that the originate-to-
distribute model of securitization is believed to have fostered an 
undisciplined mortgage lending industry, including the making of 
subprime loans. The Dodd–Frank Act addresses the originate-to-
distribute model by requiring securitizers to retain skin in the 
game, i.e., to retain some realistic risk of loss.
26
 The theory is that 
by aligning the incentives of securitizers—meaning in this case the 
originators of the loans—and investors, the lending industry will 
become more disciplined.  
A remaining issue is the extent to which the originate-to-
distribute model actually caused mortgage underwriting standards 
to fall. Some argue standards fell because of U.S. governmental 
pressure on banks and other mortgage lenders to make and 
securitize subprime mortgage loans to expand homeownership.
27
 
The fall in standards also may reflect distortions caused by the 
liquidity glut of the time when lenders competed aggressively for 
business,
28
 or it may have been caused by conflicts of interest 
between lending firms and their employees in charge of setting 
lending standards, such as employees being paid for booking loans 
regardless of the loans’ long-term performance.29 Blaming the 
originate-to-distribute model for lower mortgage underwriting 
                                                                                                             
 
 25. Id.  
 26. See supra text accompanying notes 16–19. 
 27. See generally Peter J. Wallison, The Lost Cause: The Failure of the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, AEI FINANCIAL SERVICES OUTLOOK 
(January–February 2011), available at http://www.aei.org/files/2011/02/10/FSO 
-2011-02-g.pdf. 
 28. Id. at 3–4 (noting the deterioration of mortgage underwriting standards 
in the years prior to the bubble’s collapse). 
 29. Carlos Garriga, Lending Standards in Mortgage Market, FEDERAL 
RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS ECONOMIC SYNOPSES (2009), available at http:// 
research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/09/ES0923.pdf (describing generally that 
lending standards were too loose). 
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standards also does not explain why standards were not similarly 
lowered for originating non-mortgage financial assets used in other 
types of securitization transactions. Nor does it explain why the 
ultimate beneficial owners of the mortgage loans—the investors in 
the ABS—did not govern their investments by the same strict 
lending standards that they would observe but for the separation of 
origination and ownership. 
The extent to which the originate-to-distribute model actually 
contributed to the financial crisis may never be known. If that 
model was not a significant causal factor, Dodd–Frank’s skin-in-
the-game requirement may well constitute overregulation.  
Also, it is ironic that skin-in-the game can even lull investors 
into a false sense of security. In the financial crisis, for example, 
there is some evidence that investors purchased senior tranches of 
ABS because underwriters retained the most subordinated 
interests—creating what I have termed a “mutual misinformation” 
problem.
30
 
To its credit, though, Dodd–Frank mandates that the Financial 
Services Oversight Council submit a report to Congress on the 
macroeconomic effects of the skin-in-the-game requirements, 
including possibly proactively regulating mortgage origination as 
an alternative or supplement.
31
   
B. Dodd–Frank Underregulates and Fails to Regulate other Flaws 
Dodd–Frank underregulates, and in some cases fails to 
regulate, other flaws of securitization. For example, Dodd–Frank 
fails to meaningfully address the danger of mixing politics and 
finance, as occurred before the financial crisis with the 
governmental pressure to securitize subprime mortgage loans to 
expand home ownership.
32
  
Dodd–Frank also does not directly address the problem of 
overreliance on mathematical modeling. Mathematical models are 
not inherently problematic. To the contrary, if the model is realistic 
and the inputted data are reliable, models can yield accurate 
predictions of real events. However, if the model is unrealistic or 
the inputted data are unreliable—as occurred when unexpectedly 
high default rates due to the housing collapse undermined the value 
of ABS CDO securities—it can be misleading. 
Because the financial crisis has shaken faith in the market’s 
ability to analyze and measure risk through models, this 
                                                                                                             
 30. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 241–42. 
 31. Dodd–Frank Act § 946 (2010). 
 32. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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overreliance on mathematical models should, to some extent, be 
self-correcting. In the long term, however, I fear that, as market 
experience has often shown, investor memories will become short. 
Dodd–Frank also fails to address the complacency problem.33 I 
am not sure, however, that regulation is an effective method of 
changing human behavior. Because there is a perceived safety in 
numbers, market participants will inevitably engage in herd 
behavior. And, if others are doing it, some people will continue to 
invest in high-yielding securities they cannot understand. When I 
was a law student, I took a seminar in legislation with the great 
legislative scholar, Frank Grad. He would often observe that the 
real problem is not statutory drafting per se but the fact that 
statutes apply to, and are applied by, people.   
Dodd–Frank also does not address the servicing problem, but I 
find that less troublesome. Parties can—and should have incentive 
to—write underlying deal documentation that sets clearer and more 
flexible guidelines and more certain reimbursement procedures for 
loan restructuring, especially when restructuring appears to be 
superior to foreclosure. Parties can also minimize allocating cash 
flows to investors in ways that create conflicts. Furthermore, 
parties can agree, when appropriate, to subject servicers to more 
realistic performance standards, perhaps akin to a business 
judgment rule that allows them to restructure loans in good faith 
without being exposed to liability.
34
  
C. Dodd–Frank Overregulates by Addressing Aspects of 
Securitization that are Not Flawed 
Dodd–Frank overregulates by addressing some aspects of 
securitization that are not flawed. I have already indicated that the 
skin-in-the-game requirement might constitute overregulation. 
Dodd–Frank also may overregulate in its requirements for more 
standardized disclosure of information. In principle it should be 
helpful for investors to get that information, including information 
                                                                                                             
 33. Cf. RANDALL S. KROSZNER & ROBERT J. SHILLER, REFORMING U.S. 
FINANCIAL MARKETS: REFLECTIONS BEFORE AND BEYOND DODD-FRANK 16 
(2009) (comparing the current complacency with that of the Great Depression 
era); Scott McCleskey, The Scott McCleskey Report: Assessing Dodd–Frank: 
Systemic Risk, GOVERNANCE, RISK AND COMPLIANCE: DODD FRANK WATCH, 1 
(July 10, 2010), http://www.complinet.com/dodd-frank/news/analysis/article/the 
-scott-mccleskey-report-assessing-dodd-frank-systemic-risk.html (noting there is 
a complacency issue in the models used to assess market risk).  
 34. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the 
Dilemma of the Indenture Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1037 (2008) (arguing this 
standard should apply to indenture trustee duties after default). 
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about the financial assets underlying each class of ABS. In my 
experience, though, prospectuses usually already provide this type 
of information.
35
 Furthermore, although Dodd–Frank will require 
securitizers to engage in a due-diligence review of the underlying 
financial assets and to disclose to investors the nature of the 
review, that too, in my experience, is already routinely done.  
The larger problem is that investors do not always read and 
understand the disclosed information.
36
 There are at least two 
reasons for this. One reason is complacency, discussed above. The 
second reason is a conflict of interest within investing firms. As 
investments become more complex, conflicts of interest are 
increasingly driven by short-term management compensation 
schemes, especially for technically sophisticated secondary 
managers.
37
  
For example, as the VaR, or value-at-risk, model for measuring 
investment-portfolio risk became more accepted, financial firms 
began compensating secondary managers not only for generating 
profits but also for generating profits with low risks, as measured 
by VaR. Secondary managers therefore turned to investment 
products with low VaR risk profiles, like credit-default swaps that 
generate small gains but only rarely have losses. The managers 
knew, but did not always explain to their seniors, that any losses 
that might eventually occur would be huge. 
                                                                                                             
 35. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (1994) (noting there must be a clear 
presentation of information to potential investors); JAMES D. COX ET AL., 
SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 143–47 (2009) (discussing 
disclosure requirements).  
 36. The Dodd–Frank Act does attempt to address other possible flaws that 
have been associated with securitization: that investors in securitization 
transactions may over-rely on rating-agency ratings, and that derivatives are 
largely unregulated. The extent of appropriate reliance on ratings, and indeed the 
integrity of the ratings process itself, are matters of concern to debt markets 
generally, not merely to securitization markets. Similarly, the question of 
derivatives regulation goes far beyond securitization, and, in my experience, 
virtually only non-standardized derivatives—a type not the primary focus of 
Dodd–Frank, which requires standardized derivatives to be traded in centralized 
clearing houses—tie into securitization transactions. The Dodd–Frank Act 
requires that standard derivatives be cleared through central clearinghouses. 
Dodd–Frank Act § 956 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5641 (2010)). Certain 
customized derivative transactions, as well as derivatives transactions by non-
financial companies, however, are not subject to centralized clearing. Dodd–
Frank Act §§ 723, 727, 731, 763, 764, 766 (2010). I therefore will not focus on 
rating agencies or derivatives. 
 37. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The 
Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457 
(2009); Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 261–62. 
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This is an intra-firm conflict, quite unlike the traditional focus 
of scholars and politicians on conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. Dodd–Frank attempts to fix the traditional type of 
conflict but completely ignores the problem of secondary-
management conflicts.
38
 The regulatory response should require 
that the compensation of managers of financial institutions, 
including secondary managers, be based more on long-term firm 
performance. 
Dodd–Frank’s focus on disclosure may also be insufficient.39 
Disclosure itself can never be a complete answer to complexity.
40
 
In the foregoing context, Dodd–Frank’s mandate to the SEC—
to adopt regulations requiring rating agency reports on 
securitization transactions to explain the rights available to 
investors and compare those rights with rights in similar 
transactions—is somewhat incongruous because it places 
disclosure obligations on rating agencies. To the extent this 
information is material, its inclusion should already be required in 
any prospectus accompanying the sale of ABS. Requiring rating 
agencies to also disclose this information is, to that extent, 
overregulation.
41
   
CONCLUSION 
At the outset of this lecture, I questioned whether Dodd–Frank 
or any other legislation should have the goal of protecting the 
largest and most sophisticated investors. I certainly do not believe 
these investors need protection as a matter of governmental 
paternalism. On the other hand, their failures can cause terrible 
externalities, potentially having systemic consequences to the 
                                                                                                             
 38. Dodd–Frank’s attempt to fix the traditional conflict might actually 
backfire. Recent research by Professor Iman Anabtawi at UCLA suggests that 
shareholders, even more than senior executives, want companies to take risks. 
 39. The other market imperfections—complacency and a type of tragedy of 
the commons in which the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue 
to individual market participants, each of whom is motivated to maximize use of 
the resource, whereas the costs of exploitation are distributed more widely—are 
matters of concern to debt markets generally, not merely to securitization 
markets, so I won’t focus on them. 
 40. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH. L. REV. 1109 (2008) (arguing that disclosure is a 
necessary but insufficient response to complexity); Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1 (2004) (same). 
 41. Although, I can see an argument that rating agencies are likely to have 
broader industry knowledge, enabling them to more easily prepare that 
disclosure. 
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financial system. To that extent, protecting those investors will 
protect others.  
I also observed that some financial products, such as 
securitization, have become so complex that disclosure can never 
be a complete answer. Because of this increasing complexity, 
failures are and will continue to be inevitable. Ex post regulatory 
responses, such as financial market stabilizers, will therefore 
become increasingly important to supplement ex ante regulatory 
restrictions.
42
   
Finally, although Dodd–Frank imperfectly addresses 
securitization, we can hope that the administrative rulemaking it 
delegates will eventually curtail some of the overregulation, and 
that the Financial Stability Oversight Council created by Dodd-
Frank will eventually recommend fixes for the underregulation. 
 
                                                                                                             
 42. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches to 
Financial Regulation: The Chapman Dialogue Series and Law Review 
Symposium Keynote Address, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 257 (2011). 
